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It is not  too  great a  generalisation to  sugqest that  the  probleM  of 
govern~nce represents one  of the major  challenges  to  the modern 
world.  All  too often. however,  our  understanding  of the  coMplexity of 
the  po11cy-mak1ng  process  falls short of the  tasks  at hand.  To-date 
the rapid  increases  in  the  role and  influence,  potential  and  actual, 
of government  and  the public  sector  has  not  seen  an  appropriate 
response  from  the academic  community.  There  is clearly a  need  for  us 
to meet  the demands  for comprehension  and  analysis  of the  public 
sector and  its role  in the  economic,  political  and  social  sphere at both 
the  domestic  and  international  level.  lhese arguments,  valid at the 
general  level, are particularly apposite  to  the current Australian 
context. 
These  discussion  papers  will  be  but  a modest  response  to the  need  to 
provide  information  and  open  up  discussion on  some  of the more 
pressing  issues  in the public domain.  In  this  paper,  the second  in 
the series, Dick  Robison  and  Garry  Rodan  tackle one  of the  major 
issues facing  Australia in  the 1980s- namely  the most  appropriate 
way  to undertake  the restructuring of Austral ian  Industry.  In 
contrast to the philosophy which  has  prevailed  in policy-naking 
circles over  the  last five years  or so, they  argue  that one  of  the 
most  appropriate ways  to  facilitate the process  of  restructuring  is 
through  a process  of greater state  involvement.  This paper  is 
unashamedly  provocative  and  geared  to the  second  aim  of our 
discussion  series - the stimulation of debate  on  issues  of 
considerable moment  in  the  public  domain. 
Richard  Higgott 
Chainnan 
Social  and  Political  Theory  Programrre 
Murdoch  University 
May  1983 1 
It is  quite clear that Australian industry  is in  crisis.  Workers 
are being  shed  at an  increasing rate,  investment  continues  to 
decline while  productivity and  technology  lag  further behind  that 
of overseas  competitors. 
The  problem  has  so  far been  addressed  in  two  ways:  a downward  push 
on  wages  and  a  resolve  to  maintain  protection.  Yet  it is difficult 
to see  how  these  two  strategies, as  presently conceived,  can  be 
effective.  It is precisely in  those  industries  receiving  the 
heaviest protection,  footwear,  textiles,  clothing,  transport 
equipment  and  fabricated metal  products,  that the  greatest 
unemployment  has  occurred  recently and  where  the  lag  in technology, 
productivity and  investment  is most  serious  1.  On  the  wages  front, 
no  one  has  yet explained exactly  how  far wages will  have  to  be 
depressed  before profitability and  competitiveness  return.  Given 
existing levels of investment  and  technology  in Australian  industry, 
there  is nothing  to  suggest in  the  argument  of free-market 
economists  that anythinq  higher  than  those  \-/age  levels existing in 
the Third  World  would  make  an  impact. 
Clearly  the  problem  is more  complex  than  imagined  by  business,  the 
unions  or either of the  major  political  parties.  Any  serious 
answer  must  involve  a  more  sophisticated appreciation of the 
complexities  of trade  and  capital  investment  on  a global  scale and 
confront  the  question  of capital  investment  and  restructuring  in 
conjunction  with  wages  and  protection. 
What  answers  do  we  have?  Perhaps  the  most  persistent alternative 
thesis  has  been  that of the  free marketeers  of which  W.A.'s  John 
Hyde  has  been  the  most  vocal.  The  'free market•  thesis urges  the 
abolition of protection  in  the  expectation  that inefficient firms 
will  go  to  the  wall  and  that capital  will  be  redirected into 
sectors where  Australian  industry is or can  be  competitive,  i.e., 
where  it has  a comparative  advantage.  There  are  a number  of 
serious  problems  with  this thesis. 2 
First,  the  result of the simple  abolition of tariffs is more  likely 
to result in  the  obliteration of Australian  industry rather than  any 
successful  or predictable restructuring of industry.  Free  marketeers 
have  yet to nominate  an  industry outside  the  mining  and  agricultural 
sectors  in which  Australia might  compete  openly  in  a  free  market. 
Can  'lie,  for  example, r-ealistically expect  to  challenge  Japan  in 
computers  or Germany  in automotive  engineering?  The  disasterous 
effects on  Argentinian  industry as  a  result of the  large-scale 
removal  of protection should  have  taught free  trade  theorists at 
least one  major  lesson.  It is possible  that at any  gi ven  time  a 
country  may  enjoy little or no  comparative  advantage  in  industry. 
It is naive  to expect  that capital  or labour would  or should  sit 
back  and  watch  industries fall  simply  because  to  do  so  would  be 
consistent with  the  abstract law  of comparative  advantage. 
Second,  to  assume  that the  industries and  firms  which  would  survive 
tariff reductions  \•IOuld  necessarily be  the most  efficient can  only 
really be  supported  by  tautological  reasoning.  Cost efficiency in 
production  does  not  equate  directly with  the  capacity to  obtain 
finance  or withstand  takeover bids.  Further,  the  removal  of  tariffs 
may  Simply  facilitate  the  entry of foreign  goods  made  competitive 
not  solely by  factors  of higher  efficiency but  by  government 
subsidy  or  corporate  dumping.  Ironically,  free  trade  policies  would, 
in  this case,  benefit  'mercantilist raiders' . 
Third.  in a world  in which  tariff barriers still exist elsewhere 
investors would  not consider manufacturing  goods  in  Australia unless 
they  could  be  sure of marketing  them  successfully  - no  matter what 
'comparat1ve  advantage'  Australia might  be  seen  by  theorists to 
enjoy.  The  investment  tendencies  of the  Japanese  most  clearly 
illustrate the  point.  In  instances  they  have  overlooked  cheaper 
production  cost opportunities  in Southeast Asia  in  favour  of 
directly investing  in  the United  States and  Western  Europe  in  such 
industries as  electronics,  automobiles  and  motorcycles.  In  areas 
of  industry  involving  the  more  sophisticated processes,  the  attempt 
to  locate production  close  to  or within  Europe  and  the  US  is a top 
priority for  the  Japanese.  again  for  market  reasons  2  The  initial 3 
response  of Japanese  investors to  the  Singaporean  drive  for  higher 
value-added  investments  has  seemingly  confirmed  this  strategy  3. 
The  point  to  recognize  is that individual  firms  have  their own 
international  divisions of  labour which  are  the  outcome  of a host 
of complex  considerations  peculiar to  that firm's  interests and 
corporate  strategy to  which  it may  be  bound.  Again,  these  do  not 
directly equate  with  the abstract law  of comparative  advantage. 
What  may  be  of  'comparative  advantage'  to one  firm  may  not  be  to 
another  in  the  same  industry. 
Fourth,  the  whole  concept  of  international  trade  taking  place  in  a 
free market  and  being  structured by  comparative  advantage  is,  and 
always  has  been,  to  use  a  term  popular  with  the Right,  woolly-headed. 
Japan,  Singapore  and  other so-called miracle economies  have  not 
achieved  dominance  in  international  trade solely because  of some 
natural  comparative  advantage.  Comparative  advantage  is created; 
it is the  work  of people  and  governments .  Japan  in  1880  possessed 
no  comparative  advantage  for  steel  manufacture  and  yet it entered  the 
field and  has  achieved  a dominant  position.  It did  the  same  in  the 
1950s  with  shipbuilding and  in  the  1970s  with  computers.  How  did it 
succeed?  By  the  implementation  of long-term  strategies in  which 
government  financed,  subsidised,  protected and  directed capital 
investment.  The  relationship between  state and  capital  itself was 
the  crucial  element  in  the  comparative  advantage  of Japan.  Even  in 
those  countries  where  tariff protection has  been  almost  non-existent, 
such  as  Singapore  and  Malaysia,  the  governments  of  these  countries 
have  also directly and  indirectly subsidised  capital  in  a  host of 
ways.  Of  great  significance in  these  two  countries  has  been  the 
state's suppression of organised  labour as  a fundamental  factor in 
creating the  comparative  advantage  of cheap  labour.  We  should  not 
forget  that labour  is after all  a  factor of production  and  one  which 
hardly  has  free  expression  in  the market  place  in these  countries 4. 
In  the current world  industrial  stakes~ the  Japanese,  the  Koreans, 
the  Taiwanese,  the  Singaporeans,  Brazilians  and,  to a  lesser extent, 
the  Germans  and  Swedes,  are doing  better than  the Americans,  British 
and  the  Australians  largely because  of  their superior  government-
co-ordinated  industrial  strategies and  the  integration of political 4 
and  economic  power  in  the  pursuit of these  strategies.  Victims  of 
our  own  ideological  attachments  to  a mythical  free  market,  we  and 
the Americans  flounder  in a  one-sided contest. 
We  are  in a  situation where  we  must  accept  that in  the  real, hard 
world  comparative  advantage  is essentially created and  not  given. 
In  the  creation of our comparative  advantage  we  have  the capacity  to 
dPvelop  areas  of manufacture  where  we  can  be  competitive  within  our 
domestic market  and  internationally.  There  are,  of course,  limits. 
lven within  the  most  imaginative,  innovative  and  co-ordinated 
strategies involving  co-operation  between  capital, state and  labour 
we  could  not  expect  to match  the  technological  and  research  resources 
of the  major  industrial  economies.  So  the  selection of areas  of 
concentration must  be  carefully considered.  However,  the  point is 
that the  selection need  not be  dominated  by  the  traditional  criteria 
applied by  comparative  advantage  theory.  There  is no  reason  why  the 
co-called sunset  industries  in steel, whitegoods,  textiles etc. 
cannot  be  made  viable within Australia with  intelligent programmes 
of capital  reinvestment  and  reorganisation of production systems. 
The  growth  in  productivity of the United  States'  textile industry of 
double  the  national  average  during  the  1960s  and  1970s  (second  only 
to  electronics)  and  its continual  growth  as  a  major  export  industry, 
in  spite of stiff cornpetition from  cheap  labour  countries, demonstrates 
that it is  possible  for  such  industries  to  survi ve  high  wage 
structures 5  At  the  same  time,  of course,  it will  be  necessary  to 
n1ake  moves  into higher  technology  areas  6. 
Most  important,  however,  social  and  political  factors  should  now  be 
legitimately included  in  the criteria upon  which  we  base  our 
selection of industries and  sectors  in whi ch  to  concentrate 
investment.  The  capacity of industries  to  employ  people  and  to 
provide  flexible,  skilled and  stimulating employment  must  be 
foremost  in our thinking.  One  thing is surely evident and  that is 
that the  mind-numbing,  production-line processing  has  become 
technologically obsolete and  economically  limiting.  As  Robert 
Reich  has  pointed  out  7,  the  future  for growth  and  higher  return 
capital  investment  lies less  in  'Taylorist'  refinements  in 
standardised,  high  volume  production  techniques  and  more  in  the 5 
small-volume,  highly  sophisticated product  lines.  In  the  latter 
it is the  ability to  develop  new  technologies  rather  than  modify 
the  old which  is crucial. 
It is  no  coincidence  that the  greatest success  in  developing  new 
technologies  has  taken  place  in Japan.  In  Japan  the  structure of 
the work  environment  emphasises  flexibility and  initiative rather 
than  rigid hierarchical  structures  of management  control  over 
labour.  The  old  hierarchical  structure  is  not  only  alienating for 
the workforce  but, most  importantly,  it is antiquated and 
counterproductive  in  economic  terms,  stifling imagination  and 
creativity.  The  revival  of the confrontationist approach  to 
management  surfacing  in  Australia is not only  an  inadequate 
response  by  capital, but one  which  demonstrates  the  enormity  of 
the  conceptual  leap  required  to create a work  environment  more 
appropriate  to  the  new  era  in  technology. 
l'he  development  of higher  technology  industries  requires  much  more 
than  an  upgrading  of investment  in machinery  and  plant.  Upgrading 
the  skills of workers  and  management  is integral.  In  technical  and 
higher education Australia already  lags  behing  the  OECD  countries 
and  now  we  are  under  challenge  from  the  leading  newly-industrialising 
countries  of Asia  as  their educational  levels  rise dramatically.  If 
we  are  to  survive  in  the world  of  new  technology  then  the  commitment 
to  and  conception  of  education  requires  urgent  reappraisal.  The 
value  of general  educational  skills  in  particular must  be  more 
widely  recognised  so  that adaptability and  re-training is quickly 
and  easily accommodatedand  the rigidity of standardised  thinking 
is  transcended.  The  task  is not one  of just boosting  technicians 
but developing  the  conceptual  ability to  analyse  and  respond  to 
rapidly changing  circumstances.  Education  and  training must  be 
more  b~oadly integrated in  the  community  rather than  controlled 
.~ 
withinAflexible and  conservative  institutional  structures.  The 
resistence to  higher education  and  the  anti-intellectualism 
prevalent in  Australian  business  and  unions  is a luxury  we  can  no 
longer  afford. 6 
Can  we  realistically expect to achieve  any  comparative  advantage  of 
the  sort described  above?  Business  has  been  loud  in  its condemnation 
of the  inability of unions  to comprehend  the  complexities  of the  new 
situation.  The  unrelenting  pressure  to  maintain  or  increase wage 
levels and  reduce  working  hours  is seen  as  evidence  of this inability. 
Certainly  the  failure of the union  movement  to  develop  more 
sophisticated responses  to capital  restructuring does  not  inspire 
confidence.  Rather  than  expand  efforts to  research  the  nature of 
structural  change  and  the  long-term  implications  for  labour,  unions 
have  pursued  a  short-term,  ad  hoc  approach  to  the  problem.  However, 
the assault  upon  the unions  has  been  well  vented  and  so  far business 
has  escaped  the microscope.  Yet  it is  precisely the nature of 
business  in  Australia which  lies at the heart of the  problem. 
Business  has  long  argued  that it is held  back  only  by  the  shackles 
of government  and  unions;  taxes,  regulations and  wages. 
Representative  of this approach,  Des  Keegan  of the  Artstt•alian  noted, 
in  reference to  the  Economic  Summit;  "Business  has  really come  dm-Jn 
to Canberra  to  tell  the  Government  that it  isn't running  the  show 
and  that the jobs  come  out of the private  sector.  'Give  us  the tools, 
depreciation  breaks  and  the  like, and  we  will  give  you  the  jobs  to 
win  the  next  poll. '  -that's the  real  message  from  business."  8 
Yet  we  see  in Australia a  preference  for  what  Reich  calls  'paper 
entrepreneurship'  rather than  investment  in  production 9.  Whilst 
investment  lags  the business  world  is constantly buzzing  with 
activity as  vast sums  are  spent taking  over already existing 
companies  and  selling them  again.  Paper  profits and  losses are 
made  but  fe\'1  rea 1 advances  in  so 1  vi ng  the prob 1  ems  of production 
relevant to our  present situation are evident.  It is of course 
difficult to  blame  business  if there is more  profit to  be  made 
in  such  dealings, or  in  property speculation,  than  in  long-term 
investment  in  production.  Business  is the  victim  and  product  of 
the  way  in  which  capitalism has  historically developed  in 
Australia.  Nevertheless,  the failure of  business  to  comprehend 
the  long-term  consequences  of continuing  to  operate within  the 
confines  of their inherited  structures  is a cause  for concern. 7 
The  claim by  business  that it has  long  been  constrained  by  unions 
and  government  also  lacks  substance.  In  Southeast Asia  a  relative 
paradise  exists with  tame  unions,  low  wages,  few  constraints on 
pollution,  less stringent safety regulations,  and  attract1ve  tax 
regimes.  Yet  Australian-based companies  have  not  moved  into the 
region  to  any  great extent in  comparison  with  the French,  Dutch, 
Canadians,  Scandinavians,  Germans  or British,  in  spite of the 
strategic advantage  1°.  Where  they  have  their performances  have  in 
general  been  unimpressive.  It is hard  not  to conclude  that 
Australian-based  capital  is weak  in  both  will  and  capacity  to 
comprehend  or to  meet  the challenges  posed. 
In  theory,  public  investment and  public enterprise would  appear  to 
constitute the  best hope  for the  long-term  prospects  of Australian 
industry given  that they  are potentially susceptible to  planning 
on  the basis of broader  and  longer  term  criteria.  One  problem  is 
whether  state bureaucrats  and  any  government  is more  able  than 
unions  and  business  to stop fiddling with  the  existing variables 
and  make  the  sort of qualitative conceptual  leap  necessary  to 
project Australia  into the  new  forms  of capital  investment  and 
labour  organisation  required  to  harness  industry  to social 
objectives.  Certainly capi tal  (in  political  terms  the  Liberal 
Party)  shows  no  indication of recogni sing  the  public  sector as  a 
creative economic  force  - in  sharp  contrast with  the  Japanese  and 
more  advanced  Western  European  policy makers.  Continual  braying 
about  the  'dead  hand  of socialism'  appears  to  indicate  that the 
ideological  position of business  remains  firmly  attached  to 
nineteenth  century  perceptions of the  appropriate  roles of 
capital, labour  and  the state. 
It must  be  emphasised  that the  current malaise  of Australian 
industry is not the  consequence  of just another downturn  in  the 
international  economy.  This  particular recession  contains  a 
qualitative feature  of unique  historical  significance in  the 
development  of capitalism.  An  unprecedented  mobility enjoyed  by 
international  capital  has  facilitated the  relocation  of  industries 
and  production processes  from  country  to country.  Advances  in 
communication  networks,  transportation  (especially containerisation) 8 
and  tile  decomposi lion  of production  processes  has  made  ft possible 
for capital  to organise  production  on  a  global  scale,  taking  fullest 
advantage  of differential  wage  rates across  countries  11.  This 
process  began  before the  current recession  but has  been  ~purred on 
by  the drive  to maintain  competitiveness  in  the face of rising 
production  cost~ in  the advanced  capitali~t countrie~.  The  once 
neat and  clear-cut international  division  of labour  in whi ch Third 
World  countries  specialised in  the export of raw  materials  and 
foodstuffs  and  the  advanced  countries  in manufactures  is becoming 
increasingly blurred 12.  The  rapid growth  of the Southeast Asian 
economies  is  closely  tied in with  this newfound  mobility ot capital. 
This  restructuring of economies  on  a global  scale will not  cease  if 
and  when  there  is  an  upturn  in the  international  economy.  The 
longer  this  is ignored  the more  difficult any  rescue  of Australian 
industry will  be. 
Whilst  the  above  argument  attempts only  to stimulate discussion  on 
an  urgent and  little  understood  problem,  there  is one  point above 
all else which  is thematic  in  the above.  The  rapid  industrialisation 
of the Cast  and  Southeast Asian  countries  is  to  a considerable degree 
the  result of the  state shaping  the  allocation of resources  to 
enhance  capital  accumulation.  Recognising  that the  state does  have 
such  a capacity,  we  can  turn our  attention  to  ways  of the  state 
putting  this potential  to  greater use  in Australia.  This  does  not, 
however,  mean  that the  newly-industrialising  countries  of Asia  should 
in  any  sense  serve  as  a  model  for economic  growth.  In  spite of the 
extremely impressive  growth  rates of these  economies,  there has  been 
a social  and  political  cost.  Instead of lowering  wage  rates in 
Australia  in a vain hope  of establishing or reviving  the  competitive-
ness  of Austrdlian  industry,  Vie  should  be  exploring ways  in  whi ch 
the  state can  promote  industries capable of supporting higher wages. 
High  wages  are, at least fram  the worker's  point of view.  an 
important mP.asure  of success  of any  industrial  programme.  By  such  a 
yardstick,  the  fast-growing  newly-industrialising countries  compare 
much  le~~ favourably  than  they  do  with  the  more  abc;tract  GOP. 
Restructuring  is  taking  place  in Australia and  will  continue  to 
regardless  of whether  any  more  co-ordinated programme  between  capital, 
labour  and  state is attempted.  At  least wi  l11  the  ldLLer  option  the 
nature  of  restructuring  could  be  directed towards  the  realisation of 
clearly identified social  and  political  criteria. Footnotes 
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